GACA Safety Management Requirements for Saudi Aerodromes: Scope and Evidence

Operational control map

Use this map when translating the guide into system configuration or procedure. Replace every placeholder and add jurisdiction-specific rows before approval.

Control area	Minimum requirement	Owner	Evidence
Scope and applicability	Confirm entity, jurisdiction, activity and effective date.	[ASSIGN]	[EVIDENCE LINK]
Authoritative requirement	Link the current source from GACA.	[ASSIGN]	[EVIDENCE LINK]
Master data	Define fields, identifiers and ownership.	[ASSIGN]	[EVIDENCE LINK]
Workflow control	Record submission, approval, rejection and correction states.	[ASSIGN]	[EVIDENCE LINK]
Evidence	Retain source documents, acknowledgements and versions.	[ASSIGN]	[EVIDENCE LINK]
Exception handling	Assign escalation, target and acceptance authority.	[ASSIGN]	[EVIDENCE LINK]
Periodic review	Set an owner and regulatory review date.	[ASSIGN]	[EVIDENCE LINK]

Treat this as a maintained record. Store source publication, internal approval and next review dates, and preserve prior versions whenever a rule or workflow changes.

The airport remains accountable when the contractor enters airside

A contractor may own the method statement, labour and machinery. The aerodrome operator still controls the operating environment.

That distinction matters on Saudi airport development and maintenance programmes where construction, inspection and testing may take place beside aircraft movements. GACAR Part 139 makes the certificate holder responsible for infrastructure development, change management and contractor tasks, and for monitoring outsourced aerodrome services. Work affecting aerodrome operations may also constitute a major change requiring prior regulatory acceptance.

A badge, permit or escort is therefore not a transfer of responsibility. Each is one barrier in a controlled-work system.

Four permissions that should never be confused

Airports often use “permit” to describe several different approvals. Separating them closes dangerous gaps.

Permission	What it confirms	What it does not confirm
Security access	Identity has been checked and the person may enter defined zones	Competence to perform a task or move unescorted
Airside driving or equipment authorisation	Driver or operator is trained for defined areas and equipment	Approval for today's route, closure or worksite
Permit to work	A named task may proceed at a defined place and time under stated controls	Acceptance of a permanent operational change
Change or works approval	Operational consequences, interfaces and commissioning have been assessed	That today's site conditions remain safe

One person may need all four. A visitor under escort may need only security permission, but the escort and work supervisor still need task-specific authority.

What the airside work permit must control

The permit should be a live operational record, not a signed cover sheet attached to a long method statement. At minimum it should identify:

• exact worksite boundaries, access route and permitted staging area;
• task, plant, substances, excavation depth and maximum height;
• start, suspension and expiry times, including night-work conditions;
• the aerodrome representative, contractor supervisor and permit issuer;
• operational restrictions, safeguarding and weather limits;
• radio channel, call signs and loss-of-communications response;
• FOD, lighting, marking, hot-work, isolation and emergency controls;
• vehicle and personnel register, with escort arrangements;
• inspection frequency and stop-work authority;
• handback condition and responsible acceptor.

Link the permit to the safety assessment and approved change. If the location, sequence, equipment or operating window changes, pause and revalidate. “Same job, different stand” is not necessarily the same risk.

Escorts are a capacity-controlled safety function

An escort does more than show a driver the route. The escort maintains positive control of people or vehicles that cannot independently meet local airside access requirements.

Define the escort's maximum group size and vehicle ratio. The safe ratio depends on visibility, route complexity, manoeuvring area proximity, communications, convoy length and the escorted party's familiarity. A single escort cannot control a scattered work gang while also coordinating vehicles and monitoring aircraft.

The briefing should cover:

1. boundaries and prohibited areas;
2. route, convoy order and separation;
3. aircraft right of way and jet-blast or ingestion hazards;
4. FOD and loose-item control;
5. radio and visual signals;
6. actions if a vehicle separates, fails or loses contact;
7. emergency assembly and evacuation;
8. immediate stop-work conditions.

Record who was escorted, by whom, for which zone and period. A badge scan proves entry; it does not prove continuous control.

Plan the live-operation interface before issuing the permit

The highest risks sit at the boundary between the project and the operation: a crane near protected surfaces, a temporary route crossing a service road, dust affecting visibility, open trenches near movement areas, temporary lighting that resembles aeronautical lights, or a work vehicle entering an active area after a closure changes.

Build an interface control plan covering:

• project phases and the operational configuration for each phase;
• declared distances, closures, restrictions and information publication;
• physical barriers, markers, lighting and inspection;
• ATC, apron, operations, rescue and firefighting, security and airline coordination;
• plant height and obstacle control;
• emergency access and response time;
• utilities, drainage and pavement integrity;
• start-of-shift release and end-of-shift handback;
• trigger points for a new safety assessment.

ICAO's aerodrome certification resources include managing operations during construction among the relevant implementation material. ICAO's APAC training framework likewise treats aerodrome works as an SMS, risk-assessment, contractor-control and management-of-change problem—not merely a construction problem.

The daily control cycle

Before the shift

Confirm the operational configuration, current notices, weather, work boundary, equipment, competent people and emergency arrangements. Reconcile the names and vehicle registrations against the permit. Brief both contractor and airport participants together where their activities interface.

Inspect the site before release. Photographs can support the record, but they do not replace a competent inspection.

During the shift

Track entry and exit from the worksite, not only the airport gate. Supervisors should verify barriers, FOD, vehicle discipline, lighting and compliance at a risk-based frequency. Record deviations and corrective action against the permit.

Stop and reassess when:

• aircraft or vehicle routing differs from the plan;
• visibility, wind or surface conditions breach limits;
• communications fail;
• unlisted people, vehicles or plant arrive;
• barriers or lights are displaced;
• the task moves outside its approved footprint;
• an incident, near miss or safeguarding concern occurs.

Schedule pressure is not authority to improvise.

At handback

The contractor should declare the task complete; the aerodrome representative should independently accept the operational area. Check people, tools, waste, FOD, excavations, temporary markings, lights, barriers, pavement condition and system status. Record defects, restrictions and the person accepting the area.

Do not treat “crew has left” as handback. The operating configuration changes only after positive acceptance and the required operational notifications.

Contractor competence needs evidence

GACAR Part 139 requires suitable competence and training for aerodrome functions and continued competence during employment or contract. Induction attendance alone is weak evidence.

Use a role matrix for supervisor, escort, driver, plant operator, permit receiver, hot-work operative, electrician and worksite inspector. For each role, record training, assessment, area or equipment restriction, expiry and suspension. Test practical behaviours in the actual environment.

Short-term and multilingual workforces need verified understanding. Use translated material where necessary, pictograms for critical controls and a teach-back method: ask the worker to explain the boundary, stop signal and emergency action. A signature cannot demonstrate comprehension.

Measure control health, not hours without injury

Lagging injury statistics can remain green while airside defences weaken. Useful leading indicators include:

• permits suspended for changed conditions;
• unplanned people, vehicles or plant found on site;
• escort ratio or continuity breaches;
• worksite inspection completion and defect response time;
• FOD found at shift handback;
• expired or out-of-scope competencies;
• repeat permit deviations by contractor or supervisor;
• late handbacks and operational restrictions caused;
• actions overdue from works-related safety assessments.

Normalise where practical—for example, deviations per 1,000 permitted work-hours—while retaining every serious event for review.

Build the contractor mobilisation gate before site access

The safest time to resolve a contractor-control problem is before the workforce reaches the airport. Procurement and mobilisation should treat safety capability as a condition of readiness, not a document chase after award.

Prequalification should test evidence relevant to the proposed work. A civil contractor with an excellent general construction record may still be unfamiliar with aircraft movements, protected surfaces, radio discipline, FOD sensitivity and the operational consequences of an incomplete handback. Ask for comparable live-environment experience, supervisor competence, equipment-control arrangements, incident learning and the proposed management of subcontractors.

A mobilisation gate can require:

• an accepted organisation and responsibility chart;
• named competent supervisors and deputies for every shift;
• a subcontractor register with the same approval standard;
• task-specific method statements and risk assessments;
• training and competency records mapped to airside roles;
• equipment, vehicle and lifting-accessory registers;
• inspection, maintenance and defect-isolation evidence;
• emergency, communication and recovery arrangements;
• an agreed occurrence-reporting and investigation process;
• evidence that safety-critical information reaches multilingual crews;
• a schedule showing work phases and operational interfaces.

Acceptance should be conditional where evidence is incomplete, with a named action and deadline. Do not allow commercial mobilisation milestones to create assumed safety approval.

The principal contractor should remain responsible for controlling its subcontractors, but the airport needs visibility of who is actually working airside. A subcontractor added at short notice can introduce unfamiliar plant, new languages, different supervision and unassessed work methods. The permit issuer should be able to confirm that every organisation and role on the shift has passed the mobilisation gate.

Treat vehicles and plant as controlled participants

People are escorted; vehicles are often merely counted. That is not enough. A vehicle can become an obstacle, create FOD, enter a protected area, damage pavement, spill fluid, interfere with visual aids or fail where recovery disrupts operations.

Before approval, assess whether the vehicle is necessary and suitable. Record height, width, turning constraints, reversing visibility, lighting, markings, radio fit, fire extinguisher, spill kit and any load-security requirements. Check that equipment attachments and loose items are positively secured.

Define the permitted zone. An authorisation for apron service roads should not silently extend to manoeuvring areas or construction crossings. Where an escorted convoy must cross or operate near an active movement area, specify positive clearance, route protection, convoy order and recovery actions.

Plant operators need task competence as well as airside awareness. A crane operator may be competent to lift but unfamiliar with obstacle limitation, radio failure or the meaning of an immediate lowering instruction. A tipper driver may understand construction traffic yet not appreciate jet blast or aircraft right of way. Training has to join the two environments.

Daily checks should verify condition, beacons, markings, leaks, load restraint and communications. Defective plant must have a defined isolation and removal route. “Repair it after the shift” is not a safe plan for a vehicle that could strand itself beside an active stand.

Control simultaneous operations explicitly

Most live-airport risk is created not by one task, but by two legitimate activities occupying the same time and space. Concrete delivery meets an aircraft tow. A crane lift coincides with a changed runway configuration. A fuel bowser uses the diversion route created for construction. Emergency access narrows while hot work is in progress.

Use a simultaneous-operations review for each phase and shift. It should show:

Interface	Coordination question	Evidence
Aircraft and works traffic	Can routes cross, converge or create blind approaches?	approved traffic plan and briefing
Works and rescue access	Can emergency vehicles reach every required point within the operational plan?	route test or timed exercise
Excavation and utilities	Could damage disable lighting, communications, fuel or drainage?	survey, permit and isolation record
Crane and flight operation	Do height, slew and failure positions remain within accepted limits?	lifting plan and safeguarding approval
Temporary lighting and visual aids	Could a pilot or driver misread the configuration?	night inspection and operational acceptance
Dust, debris and aircraft	Can work contaminate pavements, engines or visibility?	suppression, inspection and stop criteria

The coordination meeting should produce decisions, not merely attendance. Record which activity has priority, who may stop it, what configuration is authorised and what trigger requires escalation.

Manage excavation, cranes and temporary installations as distinct hazards

Some work types deserve additional permit controls because their failure can affect the wider aerodrome.

Excavation

Confirm underground-service information, detection results, hand-dig or exclusion rules, edge protection, spoil location, drainage and backfill standard. Consider how an open excavation behaves under rain, vehicle load or jet blast. Define how it will be made safe if the shift ends early.

Cranes and elevated plant

Control maximum height, boom radius, slew limits, operating and parked positions, marking, lighting, wind limits and immediate lowering. The approval should account for the equipment's worst credible position, not only the planned lift path. Establish direct communication between the worksite and the aerodrome function authorised to suspend the activity.

Temporary barriers, lights and signs

Every temporary element can become misleading or loose. Use an approved layout, secure equipment for expected wind and blast, inspect after disturbance and remove obsolete markings promptly. A phased project needs disciplined configuration control so yesterday's route does not remain visible after today's layout takes effect.

Hot work and hazardous substances

Coordinate fire watch, extinguishing equipment, fuel operations, smoke or vapour effects and post-work monitoring. Maintain accessible substance information and spill response. The permit should identify where waste and contaminated materials go; “remove from site” is not a control unless responsibility and timing are clear.

Design emergency response for the work phase

The permanent airport emergency plan may not match a temporary construction configuration. Barriers can block access, excavations can remove turning space, temporary closures can change rendezvous points and contractors may not recognise aerodrome alarms.

For each material phase, verify:

• emergency routes and access widths;
• rescue and firefighting service awareness;
• contractor alarm, evacuation and accountability methods;
• location of first aid, fire and spill equipment;
• response to aircraft accident, plant fire, utility strike and fuel spill;
• process for suspending work and clearing routes;
• names and numbers available to every supervisor;
• arrangements for night shift and reduced staffing.

Run a tabletop exercise before high-risk work and a practical route test where access changes. Capture lessons as permit or plan changes. An emergency arrangement proven on a drawing may fail when a gate is locked, a crane is parked or a convoy blocks the turning point.

Investigate permit deviations as system signals

When a worker crosses a boundary or a vehicle arrives unlisted, removing that individual may be necessary but rarely completes the analysis. Ask how planning, briefing, supervision, marking, fatigue, language, incentives or change control made the deviation possible.

Link each deviation to the permit, contractor, supervisor, work phase and relevant control. Analyse recurrence across projects. Several minor FOD findings can reveal a weak material-control process before an ingestion event. Repeated late handbacks can show that the approved programme systematically underestimates close-out time.

Contractor performance reviews should combine serious events, normalised deviations, inspection results, action quality, reporting behaviour and demonstrated learning. Avoid a single score that lets good paperwork offset a critical operational breach. Set escalation rules for enhanced supervision, retraining, work suspension and requalification.

A minimum digital record for every airside shift

At the end of a shift, the airport should be able to reconstruct who authorised the work, who entered, what configuration applied, which inspections occurred, what changed and who accepted the handback.

The record should contain permit versions, linked assessments, personnel and vehicle attendance, briefing acknowledgement, location, inspection timestamps, photographs where useful, communications or operational restrictions, deviations, stop-and-restart decisions and final acceptance. Time, person and reason should accompany every change.

This is not documentation for its own sake. It allows the next shift to inherit the correct configuration, investigators to understand an occurrence and leaders to identify weak controls across contractors and projects.

FAQ

Does an escort remove the need for airside induction? No. The airport should define the minimum briefing for every entrant. An escort compensates for limited independent access authority; it does not make an uninformed person safe beside aircraft.

Can one permit cover a multi-month project? The project may have an overarching works approval, but operational permits should have controlled locations, phases and validity periods. Daily release should confirm that current conditions match the approved plan.

Who can stop contractor work? The contract and permit should give clear stop-work authority to relevant airport and contractor personnel. Anyone observing immediate danger should be able to trigger a safe stop without waiting for commercial approval.

Is contractor safety only the main contractor's responsibility? No. The main contractor manages its supply chain, but the aerodrome operator retains responsibility for the safe operating environment and interfaces under its certificate and SMS.

Where a system helps

A connected aviation safety platform can link the change assessment, permit, briefing, competency, escort log, inspection, occurrence, corrective action and handback. The operations team sees today's live controls; the safety team sees deteriorating barriers; leadership sees unresolved risk without chasing separate contractor spreadsheets.

Explore SafetyMS for aviation safety.

Related reading: Safety Data Without Safety Insight (KB-476) and What Is a Safety Performance Indicator in Aviation? (KB-105).

Sources

• GACA, GACAR Part 139 — Certification, Authorization and Operation of Aerodromes
• ICAO Aerodrome Certification implementation resources
• ICAO APAC, Managing Works in Progress training framework